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## THE MEANS OF UNIFYING CHINA

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I must tell the audience first that I am not an "expert" on China. I have only spent about two months and a half there. The country is immense; and when I was there it was in a state of prodigious confusion. I did not know a word of Chinese. So that I bring you tonight just the observations on China and its present condition of one American citizen who has had, during a somewhat long life, a good deal of experience in one form of administration—educational administration—and who has been interested all his life in the social and industrial conditions of the community in which he has lived. To have been interested many years in the social and industrial conditions of one's own country, if that be a free country, is a pretty good fitting, or preparation, for a cursory inspection of industrial, social, and political conditions in another country. That was all my preparation for my visit to China. I should also say that I was in the Far East on a special errand, intrusted to me by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This was a strange year in which to be an envoy from a peace-promoting organization to study the conditions under which war breaks out or peace is maintained. I had no sooner started than the inexcusable attack of Italy on Tripoli took place. I had not been long in Ceylon before Russia invaded Persia with great violence; and Great Britain, Persia's neighbor on the south, calmly looked on. When I reached China that country was still in the throes of what had been a brief civil war, comparatively restricted in its areas, and yet a civil

war. And I had only just got home when a tremendous conflagration broke out in the Balkan States. This was, indeed, a queer year in which to be looking for the means of promoting peace in the civilized and semi-civilized world. Nevertheless, the fact that I had that special errand, and in the East, added very much to the interest of my journey; because it brought me into contact with a considerable number of educated Chinese and Japanese whose desires tended strongly towards the promotion and the maintenance of peace throughout the world, and particularly between the eastern and the western peoples.

I landed at Hong Kong, and after a short stay there went to Canton. There I had my first interview with provisional republican officials, the group then in charge of the province of Kwang-Tung, the most turbulent province in China, and that province which earliest and most ardently embraced the cause of the Republic. Having a good opportunity there to ask what is for me a fundamental question with regard to any people, I asked the then governor-general, himself a soldier by profession, and recently in command of a division of the Republican army, "Will the Chinese coolie make a good soldier, brave, obedient, and patriotic?" (You may think this was a strange question for an advocate of peace; but such was the condition of China that it seemed to me the primary question.) The governor-general reflected for a time, and then made the following answer: "The Chinese coolie will fight well, provided he knows what he is fighting for, and that thing interests him." That I thought a very good answer; and its accuracy I afterwards heard confirmed by many witnesses of the fighting which had lately taken place between the revolutionary and the imperial troops. The revolutionary armies were raw levies. An American woman of admirable qualities, who had already been twelve years in China, was at Hankow during the hard fighting that took place in and near that city; and she served for months as a Red Cross nurse in the hospitals of that vicinity. She told me that she always asked one question of the wounded who came under her care—boys most of them were, or very young men. She would ask the sufferer,

"How long have you been in the army?" And the commonest answers were, "One week," "Two weeks," "Three weeks." Brave, raw recruits fought with desperation, with dauntless courage, under the most trying conditions. They had hardly any experienced leaders, and did not know their commanders; but they were ready to die for their country.

That same day in Canton about two thousand Chinese soldiers passed me in a very narrow street, so narrow that my chair had to be jammed against the wall, and the men filed by, two and two, and no space to spare. I did not see a single man in that long line that had what we call a martial bearing. They were all fully armed, but not fully uniformed, and many of them had on the left arm a white band. I asked what these bands meant; and was told that these men all belonged to a society pledged to give their lives at any moment for the country. The answer of the governor-general of Kwang-Tung province, so far as I can judge, was an accurate one. The Chinese coolie, or peasant, or mechanic will fight bravely, even desperately, if he knows what object he is fighting for, and that object interests him. These men who made up the revolutionary armies thought they were fighting for their country, for its freedom, for the coming of a just government; and that prospect interested them. Is not that just the spirit in which American youth are prepared to fight? Is not that just the spirit in which hundreds of thousands of young men went to our Civil War. Is not that just the spirit in which our Revolutionary armies were recruited? Our youth felt in both those epochs ready to die for the country, because they believed they knew what they were fighting for, and that thing appealed to them.

The young generations in China today seem to be the legitimate successors of the earlier generations (1860-81), whose fighting and marching qualities were so enthusiastically praised by such foreign observers as Swinhoe, Gordon, Wolseley, and Hamilton (British) and Ward (American). I started in China, therefore, with the conviction that the Chinese, though peaceable in their habits, will nevertheless make courageous, hardy, resolute fighters at need. There was a great need at the moment of a trustworthy public

force; but the Republic was not competent to enlist and train that force, because it had no money. There were disorders in several parts of the country, because the troops were neither paid nor properly fed; and these suffering soldiers broke out repeatedly in riots and robberies. Gradually the revolutionary levies were disbanded, and order was restored, with the help of the provincial authorities; but the poverty of the central government prevents it from organizing an effective national army.

The next question I asked of officials in China was, "What are the means of unifying this great country?" It has enormous extent. It is divided into eighteen original provinces; and the interests of those provinces are diverse in many respects. There is a condition in China like what prevailed in our thirteen colonies when the war of the Revolution was over—very different interests in the north and the south, on the coast and in the interior. The provinces are not used to acting together; they have no common language except the literary; on the contrary, people on the opposite banks of the same river are often unable to understand each other. People in adjacent mountain valleys may be unable to understand each other; the whole people is used to provincial government, but not to feeling the pressure of any national, centralized government.

The answers to the questions, "How can this great country be tied together, how can its people be brought to maintain a strong central government, what are the means of unification?" came to me only slowly during my ten-week stay in China; and it is those answers that I propose to lay before you this evening. The means of unifying China? They are the means, with one exception, which have unified this country, and made us one people, north, south, east, and west. The first means is a common language; and that the American colonies had in the Revolutionary epoch, and have had ever since, until the recent invasion by millions of alien peoples not speaking English. The New Republic took immediate measures to remedy this great lack in China. I say, "took measures." They made projects; they wrote out on paper what they would do if they

had the means. They have not had the means; they have not had the money which the measures they proposed must necessarily cost. A common language is the first unifying means China needs to employ. It is a great undertaking. It must be done through public schools all over the country, through making education universal in its elements. There have been provincial schools in China, few but good; there have been municipal and village schools; but except during the last years of the Manchu Empire there has been no attempt at universal education; and the Manchus got but little way with the project they formed. Only slowly can this need be met. Ten, fifteen, twenty years will be needed in order to diffuse throughout China among the children and young people a common language. And yet that must be accomplished before the varied populations of China can be brought, first, to a common understanding, and next, to such intercommunication that they gradually become more and more like each other, and come to enjoy the same literature.

The next means of unification that I inquired about is one which has proved to be unifying in high degree in many nations of the world. I mean a common system of taxation. You remember that the unification of Germany, which took place shortly after 1866, was preceded by common taxation methods. Duties were made the same by agreement among the many states into which the present German Empire was then divided. Posts or mails were operated by the same semi-public agency all over Germany. The same general system of taxation needs to prevail throughout a nation in order to unify its domestic habits and its industrial habits, to make them approximately alike all over the country. The condition in China has been, and is, almost such as would prevail in the United States if duties were levied at all our state boundaries on goods in transport. China collects provincial taxes on goods moving by rail or other conveyance from province to province. An English merchant in Shanghai who has long traded in the valley of the river Yangtse told me that the goods he sent from Shanghai often paid three, four, or even five duties before they arrived

at their destination, and that he could never tell how many duties or how much *in toto* was going to be paid on a given invoice. You see how difficult communication and trade are under such conditions. You see, too, how the price of goods will be affected by the operation of these local taxes. It is impossible for the same goods to be sold at the same price in different localities. A uniform system of taxation regulated by law is an indispensable means of unifying China. When I ventured to broach this doctrine to Chinese statesmen and scholars it always aroused in their minds painful recollections, and apprehensions about centralized taxation methods for the future. There is one department in which uniform taxation exists for all China, namely, in the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. On all goods coming in by sea the customs, or tariff duties, are the same for all China. But how are they collected? By the organization established and carried on for many years by Sir Robert Hart, an admirable organization, the service perfectly performed with honesty and accuracy, and the receipts applied exactly where they should be applied in accordance with existing treaties. But what is the application? To pay the interest on bonds which represent debts China was forced by western powers to incur, in order to pay indemnities to western powers, and to pay to western powers the war expenses of those powers in carrying on war against China. No Chinese official today, or at any time within a generation in China, can bear to think of this uniform tax for all China, the customs. When I spoke to three of the members of the present government about this tax, my reference to it was received with visible impatience and dislike. They simply hate to think that they have mortgaged their entire customs revenue to pay the interest on debts and reduce the principals of debts which China incurred in consequence of wars which western powers waged against her. They encounter another great difficulty in connection with this uniform tax, which is the product of a low, sensible tariff for revenue. That difficulty relates to one result of Sir Robert Hart's administration. In all the great services of the customs, which include not only the collection of the customs, but also the

construction and maintenance of the lighthouses and day marks on the coasts and rivers of China, and many works of conservancy in Chinese harbors and rivers, not a single Chinese man has been trained to responsible administrative work of that sort or any similar sort during the entire existence of the service. No Chinese has ever been appointed to anything above a clerkship in that service; and the consequence is now that the government cannot get from that service a single man, Chinese by birth, who is fit for the public service in similar departments. How natural that a Chinese statesman should hear with impatience even the name of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service!

The next unifying influence for China, as, indeed, it has been all over the world, is the provision of the necessary means of intercourse for travelers, pedlars, and traders, and of the distribution and exchange of goods. I never before was in a country without roads. I had lately visited several parts of the Far East which are under foreign supervision, as, for instance, some British colonies in the East, and had found admirable roads in great numbers, thousands of miles of hard, smooth roads constructed in the British colonies, for example; and suddenly I came to China and found it a country without made roads. The western parts of our own country existed for some time without anything that deserved the name of roads; railroads anticipated country stoned roads, and enabled us to communicate with new settlements along lines running east and west or north and south, and even crossing the continent. The railroad often preceded the settlement of the country through which it passed. Now China has not only no well-built common roads, but it possesses to this day only an insignificant amount of railroad lines. The number of miles of railroad in China now in operation does not exceed five thousand. Many a single state in our union has much more than that. I did not see a single macadamized, well-built road in China, outside a British or other foreign concession, except one. That one ran from the winter palace in Peking out to the summer palace, and was sixteen miles long; it was constructed for the passage of the imperial household twice a year. It



is impossible for us to imagine the close limitation of intercourse and traffic caused by this absence of roads. In order to unify China it is absolutely indispensable that an immense increase should be made in the mileage of railroads in that huge country. But what does that mean? That means the borrowing of thousands of millions of dollars for purposes of construction.

A long time has lately been spent in endeavoring to effect a trifling loan of \$300,000,000 for the Republic. Nearly a year those negotiations have lasted, and still there is no end of them. But that amount will not take care of the government itself for more than eighteen months. Now China is going to need railroads, long and many, and will need them urgently; and the railroads will have to be state railroads. The corporation is not sufficiently developed in China itself, among Chinese people, to be useful for the construction of the great mileage of railroads which the country needs. The state will have to do it. "When?" we may ask. Only when China has procured and set in operation a system of taxation that will yield a stable, sure revenue for the central government. That is the first thing that needs to be done in China. To this end laws are needed, public action of all sorts is needed, and foreign advisers are needed; indeed, they are indispensable, in order that the government may obtain a stable, trustworthy national income. When that is accomplished, then all things will be possible.

Sir Robert Hart in 1904 devised a plan for providing the imperial government of that day with a stable and sufficient revenue by means of a moderate land tax. It had never possessed such a thing as a revenue in the modern sense. The imperial government exacted tribute from each of the provinces; and about half the tribute in money, rice, and silks which started from each province finally reached Peking. But that tribute was for the support of the imperial household and the Manchu clan. It was never regarded as a national revenue in our sense or in the sense of any modern government, and when the Manchus abdicated they left to the new government no established system of collecting a

national revenue. They had never studied Sir Robert Hart's admirable scheme.

There are other means of national intercourse, of intercourse between the widely separated parts of a great country, of intercourse between city and city, village and village, and between town and country—posts, telegraphs, and telephones. Sir Robert Hart devised and organized a system of posts for China, and finally made it over to the government long before his retirement; and that system exists today. It is still presided over by a foreigner, but it exists. Also there are a moderate number of telegraph lines, and in some of the cities and towns a telephone system begins to be developed; but all these means of intercourse are still imperfect and inadequate. What can you expect in the way of posts in a country where there are so few railroads, no roads, and where most of the transportation is on the backs of men and animals? Here, too, you see clearly the urgent need of an immense expenditure by the central government of China, before the proper means of intercommunication can be had for unifying the nation.

What I have already said implies that the great need of China at this moment is a strong central government. The government is provisional. The elections for permanent officers are to take place next January. Up to this moment there has been only a provisional organization. What is its nature? They call it a republic; but it is a republic in a sense in which we should not use the word. It is a republic based in the first place on a very limited suffrage. Nobody knows how many persons really took part in the election of the first assembly which met at Nanking, or in that of the body now sitting at Peking; and nobody knows accurately the process by which those selections were made. Secret societies had much to do with the selections. The president is not a republican president in our sense. It was not possible that he should be. He is a dictator under republican forms. It was necessary that it should be so. It is not to be helped. Not until the next elections have been held will it be possible for us to say of China that even the form of government is genuinely republican.

When I landed in China nobody knew what the qualifications for the suffrage were to be. I asked a dozen of the officials I first met what they thought the qualifications for the suffrage should be, and found a serious division of opinion. The majority thought that the qualifications should be only educational. The others thought that there should be, as in Japan, first an educational qualification, and secondly, a property qualification. At the same moment no decision whatever had been reached as to the division of powers between the central government and the provincial governments. You will remember that one of the most serious difficulties we encountered after the Revolutionary War was to determine the division of powers between the separate states and the federal government. We finally obtained in our constitution a strict definition of that division. Unfortunately we did not make so good a one as our neighbor Canada made not long afterward.

A strong central government is indispensable to unification. The government is not strong. No government can be strong that has no revenue; and when I asked the then premier what dependable income the Republic had, he mentioned but one item, namely, the receipts from the government monopoly of salt, and he immediately added that the government manufacture of salt was badly conducted, that the salt was dirty and impure, containing many ingredients it should not contain, and that the manufacture would have to be reformed. That reform will take at least a year, and probably more; and it might be added that salt is one of the worst sources of revenue that has ever been resorted to; for it bears as heavily on the poorest as on the richest.

Nevertheless, in spite of its poverty the republican government is gaining strength all the time. It has repressed the early disorders, opened again all existing means of communication, advanced through discussion the adoption of a permanent constitution, reorganized the government bureaus at Peking, detached the government from the ancient popular superstitions, abolished the former official ceremonials, proclaimed religious toleration, and helped to free the people

from inconvenient or injurious customs like the wearing of the queue and the binding of girls' feet. It has made a large number of projects for great improvements in the public services and in education. It cannot carry out these projects until it has a revenue. Think how little the Manchu Empire, which has been governing China for centuries, left to the Republic! No elements of a strong government were transmitted from the Empire to the new government; no army, no navy, no school system, no national system of taxation, no courts or police of national quality. Indeed, the Manchu Empire transmitted to the Republic no government organization whatever. It was not a real government in the modern sense. It has not been for centuries. If the Republic, or the revolutionary movement, had done nothing else except to rid China of the Manchus, it would have fully justified its coming into existence. The deliverance of China from the Manchus was a necessary step to the coming of China into the group of great nations. The Republic gives promise of organizing a strong government if it can have as much time as we had in our country to organize the government which has conducted our national affairs since 1789. It took us thirteen years with all our experience of local government, with all our fighting quality, with all our trading experience. It took us thirteen years with a comparatively homogeneous people, and with a common language and a common religion. China will need at least as long a period of reconstruction; and the western world ought to stand by China with patience, forbearance, and hope, while she struggles with her tremendous social, industrial, and political problems.

But you will be thinking that all the considerations I have thus far adduced, and all these means of unifying China, have a very material look. They do indeed relate to language, means of transportation, and the organization of government agencies for carrying on the business of the people; and it is quite true that nations cannot be unified by such means alone. Nations are unified, and come to be strong moral units by common sentiments, feelings, and passions; and the first of those sentiments is that of national-

ity, the feeling of belonging to one group of kindred, sympathetic, united people. You may have a small nation animated by this sentiment, or an immense nation filled with the same spirit. Within the last twenty-five years among her widespread people with little means of communication, China has developed in the educated class an intense feeling of nationality; and it has proved in the end that this sentiment of the educated class was capable of being communicated to the uneducated in numberless millions. The secret societies which developed, fostered, and brought about the Revolution found it possible to enlist over a million men in the revolutionary levies. Many of these men were coolies, mechanics, and farmers; but they were capable of feeling intensely the sentiment of nationality, which had sprung up in the breasts of the educated few. The Chinese are an Oriental race, and they have now a full sense of Oriental nationalism as distinguished from Occidental. They have been roused by the sight of another Oriental race close beside them suddenly developing a tremendous force in the broad world—West as well as East—and asserting the right to control by force Oriental regions which did not originally belong to them. In short, they have had before them the example of Japan. That example has stirred deeply all the Oriental peoples; and it is impossible to see now how far that influence is going. It is plainly to be seen in India, and far beyond.

The foreign visitor in China recognizes several types of face and figure in the population, yet does not see in these diversities any strong racial differences; but the Chinese themselves count five races in China, and have put five stripes of color into their new flag. These are, however, kindred races, closely allied in origin and history. That is a very important fact with regard to the creation of this spirit of nationality. The Orient teaches the world that the pure race is the best; that crosses between unlike races seldom turn out well; and everybody knows that the cross between any Oriental stock and any European stock is regarded as unsuccessful throughout the Orient. Japan illustrates the value of a race kept pure. Wherever the Japanese go as

colonizers they keep their race pure. No European race has done that. On the contrary, the white race transported to the East has mixed with every native race it has encountered. It is the Oriental that has demonstrated the advantages of race purity.

Not only are the Chinese people penetrated with this spirit of nationality, they have been imbued with a fervent sentiment of patriotism. This, too, has originated in China with the educated class, and particularly with the young men who in recent years have been educated in Europe, America, and Japan. It was they who started the Revolution. Older people prepared it. Older people nursed it for nearly a generation; but it was fired by the Chinese youth, educated in other countries. I have never seen anywhere better evidences of a widespread and intense sentiment of patriotism than I saw in China.

Such are the chief means of unification for China. But consider for a moment what the obstacles are which this new government, now without any adequate resources, has to overcome.

In the first place, as I have already pointed out, the Manchu Empire left nothing at all to the Republic. I suppose that example is almost, if not quite, unique in the world. We have seen in Europe many transitions from one form of government to another, from one government to another. We are ourselves used to a transition every four or eight years, when the whole structure of government, with all its powers, is transmitted from one administration to another. Here is a case where an old empire went out, was extinguished, without transmitting anything of government organization or structure to its successor. Under these circumstances the poverty of China is a terrible obstacle to be overcome. It is poor not only in the sense that the government is poor, or has no resources, but that the whole population is poor. Under despotic government no people ever lays up any capital. That is one of the uniform failures of despotic government. Neither life nor property is safe under despotic government, and never has been. In China the rich man was always liable to be "squeezed"

by any official who discovered that he was rich. The Chinese who have become rich in Singapore and Penang do not dare to take their property home. They have given most generously to the cause of the Revolution; but they dare not take their properties home, because they believe that the property acquired with pain in foreign countries will be unsafe in China. Therefore there is no considerable amount of capital in China; and in this lack of accumulated savings China must borrow from outside, borrow from the western countries where capital has accumulated in huge amounts. The poverty of the Republic is the first obstacle to be overcome.

Then comes the dependence of China on the six powers that are sitting round about her and on her, each one except the United States really longing for a piece of China. What is the defence of China against that fear, that apprehension? Just the jealousy of one power toward another, or toward all the others. We are not liable to the accusation of self-interest and jealousy, because we want nothing in China in the way of a "concession," a piece of territory, or a sphere of influence; but all the other five powers want harbors, free access to the multitudinous Chinese with the products of western factories, and free opportunities for the profitable investment of western capital. Now that dependence is a fearful trial to all Chinese statesmen, to all Chinese lovers of their country. What escape from that dependence? No escape, except the invention of a national system of taxation which will yield promptly an adequate national annual revenue. That way lies the only escape from the dependent condition of China. How can such a system be established? Not by any action of the Chinese themselves unaided. There are no men in China competent for that task; no Chinese have been trained competent to establish such a revenue for the government. Therefore, foreign advice is indispensable. It must be disinterested advice; it must not come through advisers thrust upon them by any one of the six powers. It must be advice given by foreigners employed by the Chinese government itself as its servants. One of the most difficult problems before the Chinese government

today is, how to obtain disinterested foreign advisers for its service. It is encouraging that they have found one suitable adviser, Dr. George Ernest Morrison, a great friend of the Chinese people, a liberal, open-minded British subject, long resident in China, the collector of a unique library of books on China, and himself master of the library. There is a good beginning made. It is a great puzzle for the educated Chinese themselves how they can select the expert foreign advisers they reluctantly admit to be indispensable. One of the cabinet said to me, "We Chinese cannot select the right kind of foreign adviser by looking at him and talking with him. We have difficulty in discerning the character of a western person in his face and manner. His manners are sure to be different from what we call good manners; and we cannot judge by the aspect, speech, and bearing of the foreign person whether he possesses the needed qualities of integrity and good judgment." I have heard a good many Occidental gentlemen say the same thing about judging the quality of Chinese gentlemen. We feel quite alike, Orientals and Occidentals, on that subject.

What, then, are the grounds of hope for the Republic? How many Americans, Englishmen, and Scotchmen I met in China who had no hope at all for the Republic! How many who had really regretted the departure of the Manchus? I met several eminent diplomats who until the middle of April had hoped that the Manchus might return to power, and had done everything in their power to bring about that return; it was not until the middle of April that the diplomatic corps at Peking made up their minds that the Manchus had gone forever. They were taken wholly by surprise by the outbreak of the Revolution, and for months they believed that the Manchus could head a limited monarchy with constitutional adjuncts. Now the most difficult form of government to set up and carry on is a constitutional monarchy. It is vastly more difficult than to set up a republic, or a dictatorship with republican forms. Nevertheless, a great majority of the diplomats, consuls, and foreign merchants and barristers in China believed and hoped it would be possible to create in China a constitutional monarchy



after the Manchus had abdicated. There are many foreigners now resident in China who cannot bring themselves to believe that it is possible for a republic, even with a closely restricted suffrage, to be carried on in China. What ground is there for supposing, or imagining, that a republican form of government can be set up in China and be made stable? To my thinking, there is in the quality of the Chinese people as a whole strong ground for holding to that hope. The Chinese people have come through every possible struggle with adverse nature, and every possible suffering from despotic government; they have come through recurrent floods, droughts, and famines; they have been subject without defence not only to the sweeping pestilences like small-pox, cholera, and the plague, but to all the ordinary contagious diseases, to tuberculosis, and to all the fevers. Yet here they are by unknown hundreds of millions, tough, industrious, frugal, honest, and fecund. One hears of dishonest (at least, foreigners use that word in speaking of them) officials; but one seldom hears of a common Chinese man who is dishonest. They are notoriously honest in trade, in dealing with each other, and even with foreigners. They seem not to be liable to the alcoholic temptation, and as a rule are peaceably inclined, although liable, like some other peoples, to be transported by gregarious passions, superstitions, and panics. Now these are solid moral qualities in the Chinese. Their virtues are great, and high, and deep. Moreover, they have a producing value which is wonderful. They get everything possible out of the soil of China; and as a Western-trained, refined Chinese woman physician said to me in Tientsin, a woman who has been through everything that a woman can endure, and is now practising her profession in the midst of the Chinese poverty and desolation, "Here we are, poor, suffering, but indomitable!" Here is the ground for believing that it may be possible to create a free government in China. After all, the real foundations of free government all over the world lie in the character of the people. They must deserve to be free.

For an old American who has seen a good many changes of public feeling at home, and has seen a large number of alien races come into his own country by the million, it is impossible not to sympathize profoundly with the present huge effort of the Chinese people. It is impossible for a visiting American with any experience in administration and its normal difficulties not to sympathize with these few men who have taken their lives in their hands and risked their whole careers, and are trying to build up a free government in China. Who could fail to sympathize with men in such a dangerous position, trying to do this immense service to such a people? And yet I am sorry to say that the lay representatives of the western peoples, the Occidentals living in China, diplomatic, consular, commercial, or industrial, have seldom manifested during the past year genuine sympathy with this immense effort on the part of a few hundred thousand men out of the huge population of China. It is very possible, indeed, common, for a foreign merchant to remain a whole generation in China and never make the acquaintance of a single Chinese gentleman, or indeed, of any Chinese above the grade of a house-servant, a porter, or a clerk. An English merchant, who had been conducting thirty-five years a successful, widespread business in China, told me that he did not know a single word of Chinese, or a single Chinese man except his compradore. Hundreds of foreigners in China live there for many years without making the acquaintance of a single Chinese lady or gentleman. In the middle of the city of Tientsin in the British concession is a small municipal garden. On the gates of the garden there was posted until the Revolution had been some months in progress the following notice: "No Chinese or dogs allowed." The secretary of the two municipal councils in Tientsin, an admirable Scotchman who has lived there many years, told me that that notice had been on those gates during his entire residence in Tientsin, and that the practice continued, although the notice had been withdrawn. In the clubs organized and resorted to by English, Americans, and other foreigners in

the Chinese cities, no Chinese person is eligible for membership. Think what that implies concerning the probable ignorance of the Occidental resident in China concerning the Chinese people, their qualities, their hopes, and their aspirations. The western people in China who really know something about the Chinese are the missionaries, teachers, and other foreigners who go to China, and stay there, with some philanthropic purpose, or hope of doing good. They get into real contact and friendly relations with the Chinese, both educated and uneducated. One must not be surprised, therefore, if one finds among foreign business men who have lived in China only the most superficial acquaintance with Chinese conditions and qualities. On the other hand, the great confidence which foreign merchants and bankers in China exhibit in their Chinese cashiers and agents is a strong testimony to the fidelity and honesty of that class of Chinese employees. Knowledge of the Chinese language is all-important to make intercourse between Chinese and foreigners profitable and helpful. Failing that, English is the best language to use. I have seen two Chinese gentlemen, one from the north and the other from the south, give up trying to make themselves mutually understood in Chinese, and take to English as their means of communication. There they were successful. The foreign missionaries, both clerical and medical, and the foreign teachers learn something of the Chinese language, and so win access to the Chinese mind and heart.

I believe I have put before you, ladies and gentlemen, some of the difficulties, obstacles, and apprehensions which beset the path of this wonderful Revolution. I hope I have also suggested to your minds the hopes and reasonable expectations we may cherish. My journey gave me the most interesting stay in a foreign country that I ever had, or indeed ever expect to have. I could not have arrived in China at a more interesting epoch, if I had had my choice over two thousand years; and we all are living in a time when an intelligent interest in the affairs of China will add not only to the breadth of our sympathies but to the enlargement of our hopes and expectations for mankind.